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COMMENTS 
BONDS-INCOME BONDS-RIGHTS OF BONDHOLDERS AND DE-
DUCTIBILITY OF INTEREST FOR FEDERAL INCOME TAX PURPOSES-
An income bond is an obligation of a corporation on which in-
terest is payable only out of earnings, as distinguished from the 
ordinary corporate bond on which interest is a fixed charge regard-
less of earnings.1 Long regarded as a hybrid security which is to 
be issued only as a last resort, income bonds have grown sur-
prisingly in popularity over the past two decades.2 It is the pur-
pose of this comment to consider the historical background of 
income bonds, to make a comparative analysis of the bond in-
dentures as they affect investors' rights, and to consider the de-
ductibility of income bond interest in determining tax.able in-
come for federal income tax purposes. A study of the twenty-three 
companies whose income bonds are currently listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange3 is the focal point for this comment, but the 
particular problems incident to unlisted bonds of small and close-
ly-held corporations will also be considered. 
I. Rights of Income Bondholders 
Income bonds were issued chiefly in depression eras, notably 
1873, the years following 1920, 1931 to 1937, and during the 
railroad reorganizations of the 1940's.4 The income bonds were 
exchanged for fixed interest bonds or were issued to unsecured 
creditors to allow the corporation to extend the maturity dates 
of its obligations and to avoid interest during the interim, if 
earnings were not adequate. Their use was especially beneficial 
in the adjustment of the debt structure of railroads, because 
burdensome fixed charges could be avoided and yet reasonable 
protection to the creditor was assured through the relatively con-
stant income. These bonds acquired a bad name with investors, 
12 JONES, BONDS AND BOND SECURITIES, 4th ed., §606, p. 10 (1935): "Income bonds are 
the obligations of a corporation which are made payable as to either principal or interest, 
or ,both, only out of net earnings of the corporation." The comment will discuss only 
bonds, the interest on which is contingent upon earnings, because the modern bonds 
generally provide that the principal is to be paid regardless of earnings. 
2 Chicago, Milwaukee &: St. Paul Reorganization, 131 I.C.C. 673 at 694 (1928). Begin-
ning in the 1930's, the Commission has approved reorganizations where income bonds 
played an important part in the capital structure. · 
a See Appendix infra for a complete list of these bonds in alphabetical order. 
4 1 DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS, 5th ed., 232 (1953). According to 
Dewing, the earliest example of an income bond which has attracted attention was issued 
in 1848 by the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company. 
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commonly being called adjustment bonds.5 However, the fact that 
nine out of the thirty-one income bonds listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange have been issued in a voluntary exchange for 
preferred stock since 19506 indicates that their value is being in-
creasingly recognized. 
The advantages to the corporation of income bonds over other 
securities are several. First, the market may not be ripe for the 
issuance of additional equity certificates; and conventional debt 
obligations may be equally unfeasible since fixed interest would 
climb too high because the earnings-times-fixed-charges ratio is 
low.7 Second, in the case of corporations subject to governmental 
rate regulation making, the rate-making commission may, on the 
basis of a hypothetical debt ratio, reject applications for rate 
increases on the ground that the applicant has unnecessarily re-
duced earnings by paying more in taxes than would be necessary 
if part of the corporation's capitalization included securities with 
interest obligations.8 Further, because banks and insurance com-
panies are restricted in their selection of investment stocks, an 
issue of income bonds may appeal to a broader buying market. 
Finally, the deduction of the interest payments from corporate 
gross income for federal income tax purposes has probably been 
the most important current advantage. There are, however, some 
disadvantages to the corporation. In the past there has been in-
vestor resistance to buying income bonds, 0 although the present 
trend may be indicative of a growing acceptance. Also, under a 
carefully drawn indenture, interest must normally be paid when 
there are earnings, 10 whereas the use of preferred stock leaves 
discretion to the board of directors in declaring a dividend.11 
5 Hansen, "Legal and Business Aspects of Income Bonds," 11 TEMP. L. Q. 330 at 332 
(1937). 
6 See Appendix infra, Nos. 1, 5, 7(c), 9, IO, 12, 15, 19(a), 22. 
7 Investment regulations controlling the amount of stock that banks and insurance 
companies may hold provide an additional incentive for issuing income bonds in a 
reorganization. Thus if stock is issued in exchange for fixed interest bonds, such regula-
tions may not permit it to be retained, with a resultant sale at a probable loss. Issuance 
of income bonds alleviates this problem. 
8 Ardery and Abner, "Income Bonds Revisited," 57 Ptra. UTIL. FORT. 517 at 523 (1956): 
"Many commissions appear to believe that there really is not only nothing immoral in 
carrying heavier debt in order to relieve the tax burden, but they seem to think it almost 
immoral not to do this, where the alternative is subjecting the public to higher rates." 
9 GUTHMANN AND DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY, 2d ed., 146 (1948). 
10 Central of Georgia Ry. v. Central Trust Co. of New York, 135 Ga. 472, 69 S.E. 
708 (1910). 
11 See 12 FLETCHER, Cvc. CoRP., 1957 Rev. Vol., §5447 et seq. 
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From the point of view of an investor, several problems must 
be resolved regarding income bonds. Determination of the amount 
of earnings has caused difficulty. In the past, much of the con-
troversy on this point has centered on the treatment to be ac-
corded expenditures for assets of a relatively permanent nature.12 
In Day v. The Ogdensburgh and Lake Champlain R. Co.,13 the 
court permitted a deduction from earnings for expenses incurred 
in leasing another road. The court held that the indenture did not 
limit the board of directors' discretion in the determination of 
earnings. A later New York case14 reached a similar result, de-
claring that the statement in the indenture, permitting expenses 
and necessary repairs to be deducted from gross revenues, left 
the "fullest discretion" in the board to determine whether there 
are any earnings applicable to the payment of interest, and im-
posing only a requirement that the board act in good faith. When 
income is more definitely defined, however, any limitation on the 
board's discretion will be given effect.15 Thus the cost of ac-
quiring a new line cannot be charged to earnings. When limita-
tions are imposed, the cases have uniformly permitted a deduc-
tion for depreciation.16 
The indentures examined17 indicate that this problem of 
drawing the line between necessary expenses, deductible in de-
termining income for interest payments, and capital additions, 
not so deductible, has been the subject of careful draftsmanship. 
The indenture usually begins with the statement of a set rate 
12 The often-quoted rule in Union Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 99 U.S. 402 at 420 
(1878) is: "As a general proposition, net earnings are the excess of the gross earnings 
over the expenditures defrayed in producing them, aside from, and exclusive of, the ex-
penditures of capital laid out in constructing and equiping the works themselves." Yet, 
it is interesting to note that the court permitted almost two million dollars over a six-
year period for expenditures for "Station buildings, shops, and fixtures" in determining 
net income. 
13107 N.Y. 129 at 142 (1887). The indenture stated that interest was to be paid out 
of the net earnings of the company "after satisfying the expenses of operating and main-
taining the same." 
14 Thomas v. The New York and Greenwood Lake Ry. Co., 139 N.Y. 163, 34 N.E. 
877 (1893). 
Hi Spies v. Chicago & E.I.R. Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1889) 40 F. 34. 
16 Whitridge v. Mt. Vernon Woodberry Cotton Duck Co., (D.C. Md. 1913) 210 F. 302. 
As explained in Edwards v. International Pavement Co., 227 Mass. 206, II6 N.E. 266 
(1917), all necessary expenses incurred in producing the revenue must be deducted before 
there is net income available for interest. 
17 The phrase, "indentures examined," refers to the indentures of all the income 
bonds that were listed on the New York Stock Exchange as of April I, 1958. See note 
3 supra. 
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of interest being payable only out of "available net income." 
Available net income is usually defined as net income minus cer-
tain specified deductions.18 Two of the indentures expressly de-
fine net income as that amount determined by the accounting pro-
cedures of the Interstate Commerce Commission.19 The typical 
indenture, however, does not expressly define net income,20 the 
implication being that it is to be determined by the general 
accounting procedures followed by the company in the past. For 
the indentures issued by railroads, compliance with the "Uniform 
System of Accounts for Steam Roads"21 in determining "net in-
come" seems justified.22 Compliance with Regulation S-X pre-
sumably would also be warranted.23 Once net income is found, 
the specific deductions must then be taken before arriving at 
"available net income." These specific deductions tend to elimin-
ate the historical problem of the Day case, because deductions 
for capital improvements, with definite limits, are permitted in de-
termining available net income.24 
The right to an accounting to permit independent judgment 
as to whether net income exists has often been asserted by the 
bondholders. The granting or denying of such a remedy rests 
on the court's conception of the nature of the corporation's ob-
ligation. Thus, where the corporation's promise to pay interest if 
earned was not considered to create a trust relation between the 
company and the bondholders, an accounting was denied. The 
bondholder's remedy was stated to be an action at law for breach 
of contract.25 The court's rationale was that since the promise 
did not create an equitable lien on the funds of the corporation, 
18 Two of the indentures examined define income available for income bonds to be 
"net income before taxes." See Appendix infra, Nos. I, 10. 
19 See Appendix infra, Nos. 4, 6. 
20 See Appendix infra, e.g., Nos. I, 3. 
2124 Stat. 386 (1887), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §20(3), 49 C.F.R. (1949, 1958 Supp.) §10. 
22 See Kansas City So. Ry. v. United States, 231 U.S. 423 at 453 (1913). The court 
states that the classification of accounts as prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission requiring some of the expenses in lowering the grade of the road to be charged 
as operating expenses rather than to a property account does not interfere with the 
preferred stockholder's contractual rights to dividends depending on income. 
23 Regulation S-X contains the uniform accounting rules issued by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. 
24 The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company's Convertible 4½% Income Bonds, 
due 2010, provide an example. Annual payments of $5,000,000 or 2½% of total operating 
revenues, whichever is less, to a Capital Fund are expressly authorized before provision 
is made for interest payments to the income bondholder. 
25 Thomas v. The New York and Greenwood Lake Ry. Co., 139 N.Y. 163 at 176-177, 
34 N.E. 877 (1893). 
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equity does not have jurisdiction to order an accounting. Some 
courts will grant an accounting, however. One court so held 
when the trustee refused to enforce the indenture provision re-
quiring the corporation to furnish an earnings statement.26 Also, 
if a company has failed to keep separate accounts of the earnings 
of that part of the assets specifically described in the indenture, 
the income of which is pledged, an accounting has been ordered.27 
An accounting has also been granted simply on the theory that 
there is no other way to determine if there is income available for 
the bondholders.28 Because a suit for breach of contract will fail 
where the bondholder cannot establish the ·existence of earnings,29 
such liberality in permitting an accounting is desirable. The in-
dentures examined usually provide that the company will furnish 
to the trustee a detailed financial report.30 Thus, the trustee and 
the income bondholders have all the information necessary to 
determine whether the company is paying interest when it is 
earned. In the absence of such a provision, the bondholders 
must face the difficulties inherent in procuring an equitable 
decree for an accounting. 
The provisions regarding the cumulative feature of interest 
are important to the investor. Only six of the bonds examined 
are non-cumulative.31 Nine are fully cumulative.32 The remaining 
are cumulative, but cumulations are usually limited to three or 
four years' interest payments.33 An interesting problem arises 
when the principal becomes due and there has not been suffi-
cient net income to pay the accumulated interest. Two inter-
pretations of the contract are possible. The cumulative feature 
might mean that the interest will accumulate and be paid in later 
26 Buel v. B. 8: 0. Southwestern Ry. Co., 24 Misc. 616, 53 N.Y.S. 749 (1898). An 
important factor was the rather apparent collusion between the company and the trustee 
who represented the bondholders. 
27 Spies v. Chicago 8: E.I.R. Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1889) 40 F. 34. An accounting was granted 
even though the indenture stated that the board's determination of income was conclusive. 
28 Barry v. ,Missouri, K. 8: T. Ry. Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1886) 27 F. I; Moise v. Bay State 
Gas Co., (C.C. Del. 1897) 91 F. 938. Cf. also Williams v. Green Bay 8: W.R. Co., 326 U.S. 
549 (1946), holding that a dismissal of a suit brought by income bondholders for payment 
of interest on the· ground that it interfered with the internal corporate affairs was 
improper. 
29 See Corcoran v. C. 8: 0. Canal Co., 1 McArthur (8 D.C.) 358 (1874). 
30 See Appendix infra, e.g., Nos. 5, 7(c). 
31 See Appendix infra, Nos. 5, 7(c), 14(c), 18, 2l(a), 2l(b). 
32 See Appendix infra, Nos. I, 2,. 3, 6(a), 6(b), 10, 12, 13(a), 16. 
33 See Appendix infra, e.g., Nos. 4, 9. • 
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years only if there are earnings in later years.34 The other possible 
theory is that, whether or not there are earnings, the accumulated 
interest becomes a fixed debt at maturity and must be paid with 
the principal,35 irrespective of whether earnings so permit. The 
cases do not give a uniform answer. Once again the draftsmen of 
the newer indentures have seen the problem and have given 
a specific answer, usually by making the interest payable upon 
maturity of the principal, whether or not there are earnings.36 
Interest on these same bonds, however, is cumulative only to a 
limited extent. This achieves a compromise position because, al-
though the interest is not fully cumulative, to the extent that it 
is cumulative the investor knows that the company must pay it. 
Some thought should be directed to the treatment given to 
preferred stockholders in determining the comparative advantages 
and disadvantages to the investor of an income bond in a 
similar company.37 First, it is necessary to distinguish a preferred 
stock with a mandatory right to dividends, if there are earnings, 
from a preferred stock whose right is one of priority, dividends 
being payable on the preferred stock before any are paid on the 
common. Where the preferred merely has priority, the preferred 
stockholders are bound to abide by the board's decision as to 
whether dividends shall be paid, absent bad faith on the part of 
the board.38 The income bond with a distant maturity date and 
the preferred stock with dividends that are mandatory, if earn-
ings permit, are quite similar. Some writers draw minor dis-
tinctions even here, 39 but aside from the tax differences, such 
34 Such a result could be defended on the historical ground that the income bond 
was issued only in a time of financial difficulty. This type of obligation is issued to aid 
the reorganized company by avoiding a high fixed charge. Therefore, if the interest had 
to be paid on maturity of the principal, much of the benefit of the reorganization would 
be illusory because the problems due to the unsound capital structure would not be 
solved, but only postponed. Despite this argument, see note 36 infra to see how the 
cumulative interest is handled by the modern indenture. 
35 Barry v. Missouri, K. &: T. Ry. Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1886) 27 F. 1 at 7; Sears v. Greater-
N.Y. Development Co., (1st Cir. 1931) 51 F. (2d) 46. 
36 For example, see the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul &: Pacific R. Co.'s General Mort-
gage 4½% Income Bonds, Series A, due 2019. The interest accumulates up to 13½% 
of the principal amount of the bond. It becomes due and payable when the principal 
is due and payable, or on default. The Erie Ry. Co.'s General Mortgage 4½% Income 
Bonds, Series A, due 2015 is similar. 
37 See Aikman, ''Comparative Analysis of Income Bonds and Preferred Stock," 1 
TEX. L. AND LEc1s. 175 (1947). 
as 12 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP. 1957 Rev. Vol., §5443, p. 222, n. 49; 133 A.L.R. 653 (1941). 
See 8 A.L.R. (2d) 893 (1949). 
39 1 DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS, 5th ed., 235 (1953). Dewing says 
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distinctions do not appear to be of material significance.40 The 
tax differences are clear; a letter written to the preferred share-
holders of one corporation, 41 explaining why the management 
favored the proposed exchange of preferred stock for income 
_ bonds, stated that the investor would have about the same con-
tractual rights and would be in a better economic position be-
cause deductibility of the interest for tax purposes would result 
in higher profits for the company.42 
The income bond indentures provide the security holder 
with several rights on default. The right to force the company to 
pay interest is commonly stated in these terms: Failure to pay in-
terest when due, continuing for ninety days after the due date and 
payable is a default.43 Interest is due and payable semi-annually 
if there are earnings. If there is a default in making interest pay-
ments or in failing to meet any other of the company's obliga-
tions, the bondholders have a right to accelerate the principal.44 
The usual provision is that the trustee may accelerate and that 
the trustee must accelerate if the holders of a set percentage of 
the bonds so demand.45 This provision is in accord with the Trust 
Indenture Act which requires that the trustee be given power to 
recover judgment in case of a default for the whole amount of 
principal and interest remaining unpaid.46 A contingent voting 
right, given by two of the corporation indentures that were ex-
amined, 47 vests on default. 
The income bondholder's rank on liquidation should be con-
sidered in connection with a default. Three of the indentures ex-
it is much more difficult to draft a preferred stock contract making dividends mandatory, 
which the courts will interpret as a definite contractual obligation to pay, than it is to 
draft an income bond indenture imposing a definite obligation. 
40 Arizona Western Ins. Co. v. L. L. Constantin &: Co., (3d Cir. 1957) 247 F. (2d) 388. 
See 42 YALE L. J. 989 at 992 (1933). 
41 Chicago &: Eastern Illinois R. Co. (1954). 
42 The corporation's offer was accepted and the bonds are now outstanding. See 
Appendix infra, No. 5. 
43 See Appendix infra, e.g., Nos. 7(a), 16. 
44Ibid. 
45 See Appendix infra, e.g., Nos. 17, 19(a). The indenture requirement of a certain 
percentage, usually 20% to 25%, of the security holders' making a demand as a condi-
tion of accelerating has generally been enforced. Greene v. New York United Hotels, 236 
App. Div. 647, 260 N.Y.S. 405 (1932), affd. 261 N.Y. 698, 185 N.E. 798 (1933). The con-
dition may not be enforced when the trustee refused to act or acted in bad faith. Campbell 
v. Hudson &: M.R. Co., 277 App. Div. 731, 102 N.Y.S. (2d) 878 (1951), affd. 302 N.Y. 902, 
100 N.E. (2d) 183 (1951). 
46 53 Stat. 1173 (1939), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §77qqq. 
47 See Appendix infra, Nos. 6(a), 6(b). 
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amined subordinate the security holder to general creditors.48 
Sixteen companies, some with several different issues of income 
bonds,49 gave a first or second mortgage to the bondholders.5O 
Seven of the issues rank the bondholder on a par with general credi-
tors on liquidation.111 This rank on liquidation is probably not as 
important to the security holder in the companies whose inden-
tures were examined, as are their rights in a reorganization. Here 
again, the rights of the income bondholder and the preferred 
stockholder52 in two companies with otherwise the same capital 
structure and in the same financial position are very similar.53 
For a reorganization plan to be fair and equitable, the rights of the 
senior securities must receive full compensation before a junior 
security may participate in the reorganized company.114 This ab-
solute priority rule would protect the interest of the income ·bond 
that has accumulated.1"' The accumulated dividends on the pre-
ferred stock, however, would also be given priority on reorgan-
ization.116 Thus, while the income bondholder, as a creditor of 
the company, is given the theoretical right to accelerate, a right 
that the preferred stockholder does not have, the possibility of 
a reorganization, when acceleration is necessary, reduces the 
significance of this distinction between the two.57 
A preferred stockholder offered income bonds in exchange for 
his stock might wisely approve the exchange. With the variations 
already pointed out, the income bondholder will have about the 
48 See Appendix infra, Nos. I, 10, 12. 
49 See Appendix infra, Nos. 6, 7, 13, 14, 19, 21. 
50 See Appendix infra, e.g., Nos. 11, 17. 
51 See Appendix infra, Nos. 5, 7(c), 9, 14(c), 15, 19(a), 22. 
52 For simplicity, the assumption is made that the preferred stock is neither participat• 
ing nor convertible. Different results would, of course, attach if the preferred had these 
features. 
,,53 However, one important distinction between the two is that the income bond-
holder, unless subordinated, would at least share with general creditors and that the 
income bondholder, if secured by a mortgage, would have priority over the general cred-
itors to the extent of the security. Another distinction is that if the preferred stock does 
have a voting right, it will be lost by the exchange for income bonds. 
114 Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber 
Products Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939). Dodd, "The Los Angeles Lumber Products Company 
Case and Its Implications," 53 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1940); 38 MICH. L. REv. 695 (1940). 
65 Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul &: Pacific R. Co., 
318 U.S. 523 (1943). 
66 See Petition of Portland Electric Power Co., (9th Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 618, cert. 
den. 332 U.S. 837 (1947). 
57 I DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS, 5th ed., 234 (1953). See Frank, 
"Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reorganization," 19 VA. L. 
REv. 541, 698 (1933). 
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same rights that he enjoyed as a preferred stockholder. The bond-
holder is more certain of a continuing income because of the fact 
that the payments to him are a charge before taxes, which in-
creases the company profits through tax savings. 
II.' Deductibility _of Interest for Tax Purposes 
The. hybrid nature of income bonds poses a difficult problem 
with respect to the deductib~lity of "interest" payments for in-
come tax purposes. Since interest on indebtedness is deductible in 
computing taxable income,58 and dividends, being merely. a dis-
tribution of earnings to shareholders, are not, it is necessary to 
c_ategorize a security as creating either a debtor-creditor relation-
ship or one of company-shareholder.59 The Internal Revenue Code 
is of little assistance in making this determination since it does not 
define indebtedness, and dividends are merely defined as distribu-
tions of property to shareholders. 60 Where there is an uncondi-
tional promise to pay interest coupled with a fixed maturity date, 
as in the case of the ordinary bond, there is no question but that 
the periodic payments are "interest" within the meaning of the 
code and thus deductible.61 Because of their similarity to preferred 
stocks, however, the courts have considered income bonds to be 
a type of hybrid security which will not be classified as indebted-
ness unless the fact that interest payments are contingent on earn-
ings is offset by other contractual provisions which are strong 
indicia of indebtedness.62 Accordingly, opinions are ,generally in-
58 I.R.C., §163(a). · · 
59 The status of a security is of prime concern to the holder as well becau~e under 
the 195.4 code a partial exclusion and credit is allowed for dividends received (I.R.C., 
§§34 and 116), whereas no such benefits accompany interest receipts. See Seidman, "What 
the Proposed Tax Credit on Dividends Means," 179 COMM. AND FIN. CHRON. 672 (1954). 
As far as the issuing corporation is concerned, a determination is necessary for purposes 
of the personal holding company surtax (I.R.C., §§541 and 545), and whether interest 
on deferred payments is deductible, for in Burton v. Bowers, (4th Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 
429, it was held that interest on cumulated payments acquires the same status for tax 
purposes as the payment itself. 
60 I.R.C., §316. 
61 Application of the "thin capitalization" doctrine may limit the deduction in the 
!=3-Se of a closely-held corporation as explained in the text infra. 
62 See Northern Refrigerator Line, Inc. v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 824 at 828 (1943), 
where the court states: "The provision for a fixed dividend has :been sometimes regarded 
as tending to establish the relationship as that of debtor and creditor, but where, as here, 
the interest is payable, not at all events, but only out of net earnings, or other funds 
'available for dividends,' it is more indicative of a normal stockholding relationship." 
See also Crawford Drug Stores v. United States, (10th Cir. 1955) 220 F. (2d) 292. "The 
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troduced by declaring that the court will look through the form 
to the substance, 63 that the underlying intent of the parties is to 
govern,64 and that each case must be decided on its own facts.65 
Unfortunately, such statements do little more than point out the 
problem with which the court is faced. Where income bonds are 
involved, the substance itself raises the problem, the bondholders 
do not stop to consider the technical nature of their relationship 
with the corporation, and it is indeed rare for a decision to rest 
on facts that-do not appear in the case. 
The courts generally agree on the main factors to be con-
sidered; however, since the significance to be accorded any partic-
ular factor varies widely and borderline cases are decided on the 
basis of marginal factors which other courts may consider im-
material, 66 the result has been a collection of irreconcilable 
decisions. In 1946 the Supreme Court reviewed the. cases of John 
Kelley Co. v. Commissioner and Talbot Mills v. Commissioner61 
in what appeared to be an effort to settle the law. The indentures 
involved in these cases were substantially alike, except that in-
terest in the Talbot Mills case was cumulative and in the Kelley 
Co. case it was not. The Tax Court held that payments on the 
cumulative issue were dividends68 and those on the non-cumula-
tive issue were interest.69 On appeal to the circuit courts, the 
cumulative case was affirmed~0 and the non-cumulative case was 
scheme to convert the preferred stock into debentures left the debentures resembling 
preferred stock rather than indebtedness. 'In the business world interest on indebtedness 
means compensation for the use or forbearance of money.' . • . The taxpayer 'hired' 
no money here. Its owners merely swapped papers and wound up in relatively the same 
position." Commissioners v. John Kelley Co., (7th Cir. 1944) 146 F. (2d) 466 at 468, 
revd. on other grounds 326 U.S. 521 (1946). 
63 E.g., United States v. South Georgia Ry. Co., (5th Cir. 1939) 107 F. (2d) 3. 
64 E.g., Bowersock Mills and Power Co. v. Commissioner, (10th Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 
904. 
65 E.g., Commissioner v. John Kelley Co., (7th Cir. 1944) 146 F. (2d) 466, revd. 326 
U.S. 521 (1946). 
66 For example, in the case of Commissioner v. National Grange Mutual Liability 
Co., (1st Cir. 1935) 80 F. (2d) 316, the absence of voting rights was given much weight in 
the court's concluding that the relationship was one of debtor-creditor. In the case of 
Jordan Co. v. Allen, (M.D. Ga. 1949) 85 F. Supp. 437 at 443, however, which involved 
similar facts, the court held the secl:lrity to be stock and stated: "The absence of voting 
and managerial rights or the presence of only extremely limited rights, however, is of 
little probative value, since it is common both to bonds and preferred stock." 
67 326 U.S. 521 (1946), commented on in 44 MICH. L. R.Ev. 827 (1946). 
68 3 T.C. 95 (1944). 
69 1 T.C. 457 (1943). 
10 Talbot ,Mills v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1944) 146 F. (2d) 809, affd. 326 U.S. 521 
(1946). 
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reversed.71 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court, relying on Dob-
son v. Commissioner,72 held that whether payments are interest 
or dividends is a question of fact to be determined finally by the 
Tax Court and not reviewable on appeal.73 Consequently, the 
holding of the Tax Court in the non-cumulative case was rein-
stated. In effect, the Supreme Court's failure to resolve the con-
flict meant that the varying tests applied by the courts would 
continue. 74 
A review of the cases in which income-bond type securities 
have been classified for income tax purposes disclosed that the 
important considerations and their relative weights are the fol-
lowing. 
Fixed Maturity Date. The vast majority of courts consider 
the absence of a fixed date on which security holders may demand 
repayment of their principal to negate indebtedness conclusively.75 
On the other hand, the existence of a maturity date, which is 
the general rule in the case of true income bonds, is· considered 
by some courts to be decisive of indebtedness,76 while most infer 
·11 Commissioner v. John Kelley Co., (7th Cir. 1944) 146 F. (2d) 466, revd. 326 U.S .. 
521 (1946). 
72 320 U.S. 489 (1943). The Dobson case interpreted I.R.C. (1939), §114l(a) to mean 
that only "clear-cut questions of law" are reviewable from the Tax Court. But see note 
74 infra. 
73 Justice Rutledge, dissenting, argued that a question of law was presented 
because similar facts brought opposite results. He expressed his disappointment that 
the court would not establish a test to be applied by the Tax Court and thus bring them 
out of their "expert administrative fog." 
74See 4 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §26.IO(c) (1954). Circuit court 
decisions are still good authority because the Tax Court continues to cite them, and many 
circuit courts no longer feel bound by the Dobson case, note 72 supra, because I.R.C. 
(1939), §114l(a) was amended in 1948 by LR.C., §7482(a) which provides for more liberal 
review. See Rice, "Law, Fact, and Taxes: Review of Tax Court Decisions Under Section 
1141 of the Internal Revenue Code," 51 CoL. L. REv. 439 (1951). 
75 "All we now decide is that in the absence of such a provision the security cannot 
be a debt." Jewel Tea Co. v. United States, (2d Cir. 1937) 90 F. (2d) 451 at 453; United 
States v. South Georgia Ry. Co., (5th Cir. 1939) 107 F. (2d) 3. See Swoby Corp. v. Com• 
missioner, 9 T.C. 887 (1947). The only exception of any significance is Commissioner 
v. National Grange ,Mutual Liability Co., (1st Cir. 1935) 80 F. (2d) 316, which involved 
a corporation which was precluded by its charter from issuing securities that would 
mature. Another extreme case often cited is Helvering v. Richmond, F. &: P. R. Co., (4th 
Cir. 1937) 90 F. (2d) 971, in which payments were held to be interest even though there 
was no maturity date; however, interest was a fixed obligation, not contingent on earn• 
ings, and the case is generally distinguished on that basis. 
76 "The fact that ultimately he must be paid a definite sum at a fixed time marks 
his relationship to the corporation as that of creditor rather than shareholder. The final 
criterion between creditor and shareholder we believe to be the contingency of payment." 
Commissioner v. O.P.P. Holding Corp., (2d Cir. 1935) 76 F. (2d) 11 at 12; Commissioner 
v. H.P. Hood&: Sons, Inc., (1st Cir. 1944) 141 F. (2d) 467; Washmont Corp. v. Hendrickson, 
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it is merely strong evidence of indebtedness which may be offset by 
other factors evidencing a shareholder's relationship.77 An inter-
esting problem is presented where repayment of principal is guar-
anteed by a third party rather than the issuing corporation. A 
circuit court has held that such a security is to be considered as 
having a fixed maturity date,78 while previously the Tax Court 
held to the contrary.79 
Rank on Liquidation. Some courts consider subordination to 
the claims of general creditors on liquidation to be highly in-
dicative of a shareholder's relationship,80 while most consider 
it merely another factor evidencing stock but far from conclusive.81 
In general, the courts seem to stress subordination most strongly 
when it is coupled with the absence of a maturity date.82 That a 
security has a fixed maturity date, however, seems to outweigh 
any significance subordination would ordinarily be accorded.83 
(9th Cir. 1943) 137 F. (2d) 306. In John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, I T.C. 457 (1943), 
affd. 326 U.S. 521 (1946), the payments were held to be interest even though unearned 
interest was not cumulative and rights on liquidation were subordinated to the claims 
of general creditors. 
77 Crawford Drug Stores v. United States, (10th Cir. 1955) 220 F. (2d) 292; Talbot 
Mills v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1944) 149 F. (2d) 809, affd. 326 U.S. 521 (1946); Fidelity 
Savings and Loan Assn. v. Burnet, (D.C. Cir. 1933) 65 F. (2d) 477. In these cases the 
courts held the payments were dividends although the indentures provided for a fixed 
maturity date. The Talbot Mills case was decided by the same court that decided the 
Hood case, note 76 supra, leaving the status of a maturity date in the First Circuit unclear. 
See Jordan Co. v. Allen, (M.D. Ga. 1949) 85 F. Supp. 437. It should be added that there 
is some authority to the effect that a compulsory redemption provision is not synonymous 
with a provision for maturity. See Haffenreffer Brewing Co. v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 
1940) 116 F, (2d) 465 at 469; Kentucky River Coal Corp. v. Lucas, (W.D. Ky. 1931) 51 
F. (2d) 586 at 588, affd. (6th Cir. 1932) 63 F. (2d) 1007. In the case of United States v. 
Title Guarantee &: Trust Co., (6th Cir. 1943) 133 F. (2d) 990, however, the Sixth Circuit 
seems to have reversed its position. In the Haffenreffer case the court argued that such 
redemption is merely the retirement of the obligation to retire rather than retirement 
of the debt itself. This distinction is certainly of dubious validity and seems to violate 
the principle that substance rather than form is to govern. 
78 Bowersock Mills and Power Co. v. Commissioner, (10th Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 904. 
79 Northern Refrigerator Line, Inc. v. Commissioner, I T.C. 824 (1943). 
80 See, e.g., Dayton and Michigan R. Co. v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1940) 112 F. (2d) 
627 at 629; Crawford Drug Stores v. United States, (10th Cir. 1955) 220 F. (2d) 292; Jordan 
Co. v. Allen, (M.D. Ga. 1949) 85 F. Supp. 437. 
81 See, e.g., Bowersock Mills and Power Co. v. Commissioner, (10th Cir. 1949) 172 
F. (2d) 904; Commissioner v. H.P. Hood &: Sons, Inc., (1st Cir. 1944) 141 F. (2d) 467; 
Washmont Corp. v. Hendrickson, (9th Cir. 1943) 137 F. (2d) 306. 
82 For example, of the three leading cases cited in note 80, only the security in the 
Crawford case had a maturity date. 
88 For example, all the securities involved in the leading cases which appear at note 
81 had maturity dates. In the case of Talbot Mills v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1944) 146 
F. (2d) 809, affd. 326 U.S. 521 (1946), the payments were held to be dividends although 
there was a fixed maturity date; but in deciding the case, the court emphasized factors 
other than subordination. 
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The result is that in few cases can it be said that subordination 
to -the claims of general creditors was the determining factor. 
Cumulation of Payments. Whether or not periodic payments 
are cumulative was not considered a significant factor until 1944 
when the Seventh Circuit stated, "A consideration of cases in the 
Circuit Courts of Appeals and the District Courts discloses none 
where noncumulative payments, payable out of earnings -only, 
have been held to be interest."84 Although the statement quoted 
was true, it is quite misleading because the cases in which pay-
ments were non-cumulative involved securities that did not have 
a fixed maturity date or did not provide for equal rights with 
creditors on liquidation, and it was these factors that the courts 
stressed in deciding those cases.85 On the other hand, if unearned 
interest is fully cumulative and payable at maturity regardless 
of earnings, this should offset any weight the court would ordi-
narily give to the fact that interest payments are contingent on 
earnings. In effect, the security would approach the well-recog-
nized type of bond, similar to the government series "E" sav-
ings bond, on which interest is payable only at maturity. A few 
courts have _recognized this fact, 86 while most have not, considering 
the lack of absolute periodic payments to evidence a shareholder's 
relationship although the stated return must eventually be paid in 
full.8: Where interest is non-cumulative or, if cumulative,· is 
payable at maturity only if earnings are adequate, the contin-
gency of ·payment feature retains its effect of indicating a share-
holder's relationship.88 No judicial decisions were found in which 
interest was cumulative only to a limited extent, as on most of 
the bonds examined;89 however, it seems reasonable to assume that 
84 Commissioner v. John Kelley Co., (7th Cir. 1944) 146 F. (2d) 466 at 468. _ 
85 E.g., Dayton and Michigan R. Co. v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1940) 112 F. (2d) 
627; Kentucky River Coal Corp. v. Lucas, (W.D. Ky. 1931) 51 F. (2d) 586. 
86 "Since a debenture could very well call for no current annual payment of interest 
at all and provide that cumulative annual interest be paid only at maturity, the addi-
tional feature that interest be paid annually to the extent of the available net earnings 
does not prevent the instrument from being a debenture." Commissioner v. H.P. Hood 
& Sons, Inc., (1st Cir. 1944) 141 F. (2d) 467 at 470. See Washmont Corp. v. Hendrickson, 
(9th Cir. 1943) 137 F. (2d) 306 at 308; Sabine Royalty Corp. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 
1071 at 1077 (1951). 
87 See, e.g., Crawford Drug Stores v. United States, (10th Cir. 1955) 220 F. (2d) 292; 
Burton v. Bowers, (4th Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 429; Fidelity Savings and Loan Assn. v. 
Burnet, (D.C. Cir. 1933) 65 F. (2d) 477. 
ss E.g., Dayton and Michigan R. Co. v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1940) 112 F. (2d) 627; 
Commissioner v. Schmoll Fils Associated, (2d Cir. 1940) 110 F. (2d) 611. 
89 See note 36 supra and preceding text. 
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in such case the courts would treat the security as if interest was 
not cumulative at all. 
Issuance in Exchange for Stock. Since many income bonds 
have been issued in exchange for preferred stock, the question has 
arisen whether an indebtedness can be created where no new 
funds are received. Again, the courts are not in accord. Some 
decisions contain language to the effect that the "hiring" of 
money is the essence of indebtedness and thus essential to its 
creation.90 Most courts, however, take the position that indebted-
ness is merely an obligation to pay a fixed sum on a fixed date 
and the nature of the transaction giving rise to the obligation 
is immaterial.91 Where the recipients of the bonds retain their 
proportionate ownership interests, as is often the case where a 
closely-held corporation is involved, an additional problem arises 
as to whether the bonds are but a dividend in disguise.92 
Intent to Avoid Taxes. Closely allied to the problem of ex-
changed securities is the question of tax avoidance. Both issues 
are generally raised concurrently because an obvious purpose in 
exchanging income bonds for preferred stock is to avoid taxes 
by gaining an interest deduction. Where it appears that the sole 
purpose of the exchange is to avoid taxes, there are cases which 
seem to apply the so-called "business purpose" doctrine and there-
by disallow the deduction.93 On the other hand, most courts 
hold that the purpose of the exchange is immaterial; the only 
question being, has a bona fide indebtedness been created?94 
90 "Interest, within the meaning of Section 23(b), has been defined as 'the amount 
which one has contracted to pay for the use of borrowed money.' ••• These notes were 
not issued for borrowed money. They represent no new contribution to capital. They 
were exchanged for outstanding preferred stock which had been issued as a stock dividend 
to the common stockholders.'' Wetterau Grocer Co. v. Commissioner, (8th Cir. 1950) 179 
F. (2d) 158 at 160. See quotation from Commissioner v. John Kelley Co., note 62 supra. 
91 "We think, however, that the very pattern of the tax statute recognizes that in-
debtedness may be created by a distribution or by a recapitalization exchange through 
the issuance of securities out of capital or earnings or both. • • .'' Kraft Foods Co. v. 
Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1956) 232 F. (2d) 118 at 126, noted in 55 MICH. L. R.Ev. 457 (1957) 
(interest was a fixed obligation). See Commissioner v. H.P. Hood &: Sons, Inc., (1st Cir. 
1944) 141 F. (2d) 467; Sabine .Royalty Corp. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1071 (1951). 
92 See I.R.C., §302. 
93 In the case of Talbot Mills v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1944) 146 F. (2d) 809, affd. 
326 U.S. 521 (1946), the security had a fixed maturity date and "interest" was cumulative. 
Nevertheless, the court held the payments to be dividends stating (at 811), "The taxpayer 
admits that tax avoidance was an important factor in this exchange, and the Tax Court 
found that it was 'the only substantial purpose motivating the transaction.'" See Wetterau 
Grocer Co. v. Commissioner, (8th Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 158. 
94 "The inquiry is not what the purpose of the taxpayer is, but whether what is 
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Apparently both the problems of exchanged securities and tax 
avoidance assume significance primarily where the bonds are 
issued to the shareholders of a closely-held corporation, with the 
courts entertaining some doubt as to whether an indebtedness was 
ever intended.95 
Miscellaneous Considerations. Where the court is faced with 
a borderline situation, it is not unusual for it to resort to marginal 
consideration such as nomenclature in the indenture and manage-
rial rights. At best, such factors are considered as make-weights and 
do not warrant analysis in this comment.96 . 
Where a corporation issues income bonds which meet the 
requirements of an indebtedness, there is still the possibility that 
the interest deduction will not be allowed in full because of the 
"thin capitalization" doctrine.97 If long-term debt constitutes an 
unusually large part of the corporation's capitalization, under 
this doctrine only the interest on a reasonable amount is deducti-
ble. This judge-made limitation on indebtedness, applicable only 
to closely-held corporations, would seem to apply regardless of 
the nature of the debt. Where income bonds are involved, how-
ever, a larger proportion of indebtedness than would ordinarily be 
considered reasonable would be justified because there is no 
claimed to be, is in fact." Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1956) 232 F. (2d) 
118 at 128. See Commissioner v. H.P. Hood &: Sons, Inc., (1st Cir. 1944) 141 F. (2d) 467. 
Although the Tax Court implies that if the sole purpose of the exchange is to avoid 
taxes a deduction will not be allowed, the court has so readily found a concurrent business 
purpose that its position seems rather to be that tax avoidance is not a significant factor, 
but is, at best, a make-weight. See, e.g., Sabine Royalty Corp. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 
1071 (1951); New England Lime Co. v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 799 (1949); John Kelley 
Co. v. Commissioner, I T.C. 457 (1943), affd. 326 U.S. 521 (1946). The Tax Court is quite 
critical of closely-held corporations, however, and has considered the absence of a strong 
business purpose to show that the parties did not intend an indebtedness. See Gooding 
Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 408 (1954), affd. (6th Cir. 1956) 236 F. (2d) 159. 
95 For example, compare Talbot Mills v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1944) 146 F. (2d) 
809, affd. 326 U.S. 521 (1946), with Commissioner v. H.P. Hood &: Sons, Inc., (1st Cir. 
1944) 141 F. (2d) 467. These cases are indistinguishable on their facts and both were 
decided by the First Circuit. The Hood company stock was widely held, and all the stock 
of the Talbot Mills company was owned by one family. A deduction was allowed in the 
Hood case, the court stressing that tax avoidance was not to be considered. In the Talbot 
Mills case the court disallowed the deduction stating (at 812), "We have been referred 
to no case holding that the court could not look to 'the actualities of the situation' in 
determining whether corporate distributions were in fact true dividends or interest on 
indebtedness." Compare also New England Lime Co. v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 799 (1949), 
with Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 408 (1954). 
96 For a review of these factors see 4 MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 
§26.10 et seq. (1954). 
97 For an excellent treatise on this doctrine see LORE, THIN CAPITALIZATION (1958). 
See also 55 CoL. L. REv. 1054 (1955). 
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danger of acceleration or other repercussions if earnings are in-
sufficient to pay interest. 
An inspection of the income bonds listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange, in terms of the law as it now stands, shows that 
the great majority of these bonds pass the more significant tests 
as applied by the courts. All the bonds have fixed maturity dates 
and all but three98 give the holders the right to share at least equal-
ly with general creditors on liquidation. Those bonds that subor-
dinate holders to general creditors provide that interest is fully 
cumulative, however, and such a provision should temper some-
what the adverse effect of subordination. Many of the bonds were 
issued in exchange for preferred stock99 and all but two100 were 
issued in a transaction that did not result in the corporation re-
ceiving new funds. Also, the great majority of these bonds are only 
partially cumulative, a limitation of three times the yearly rate 
being typical.1°1 As mentioned above, however, language to the 
effect that these factors weigh heavily against indebtedness is 
generally confined to cases involving closely-held corporations, the 
court having cause to question whether an indebtedness was 
actually intended. Since these bonds were issued at arms-length, 
such factors would probably be of little or no significance. Accord-
ingly, only the three bonds which were exchanged for preferred 
stock and, in addition, are subordinated to general creditors on 
liquidation would seem to have a somewhat questionable status.102 
If the law is to permit deductibility of interest payments on 
any income bonds, the need for clarification in this area is ob-
vious. The reluctance of the Commissioner to lay down explicit 
standards in his regulations or rulings and to mark a safe and 
certain path to tax avoidance thereby, is understandable. Many 
income bonds, however, do achieve tax deductions, and for this 
result to depend upon the circuit in which the corporation is lo-
cated or the forum which hears the case is equally undesirable. 
If preservation of the revenue is considered important enough to 
warrant fostering confusion and uncertainty, the problem would 
seem to merit congressional treatment, closing off this possible 
98 See Appendix infra, Nos. 1, 10, 12. 
99 See Appendix infra, e.g., Nos. 5, 7(c). 
100 See Appendix infra, Nos. 3, 18. 
101 See Appendix infra, e.g., Nos. 4, 9. 
102 See note 98 supra. 
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avenue of tax advantage for all income bonds. In the absence of 
such legislation, the Commissioner should establish a well-defined 
test to determine whether the requirement of an indebtedness 
has been met. 
In formulating any such test, a distinction should be made be-
tween arms-length transactions and those that involve closely-
held corporations. Where the securities are issued at arms-length, 
the decisive factor should be whether or not there is a fixed date 
on which the security holders may enforce repayment of their 
principal. This is perhaps the only consistent difference between 
bonds and preferred stocks, and authorities in the field of finance 
generally agree that a provision for maturity is the feature that 
distinguishes bonds from stocks.103 Such a maturity date should 
appear reasonably certain to arrive prior to the time when liqui-
dation may be expected, and, in any case, there should be a maxi-
mum term allowed which would approximate the maximum term 
customary for ordinary bonds 1.ssued by corporations in the same 
or similar business and, if determinable, in similar circumstances. 
The requirement that the bond be expected to mature prior to 
liquidation would insure against maturity dates that have no 
significance.104 Of course, this limitation would not be applicable 
to corporations which have no foreseeable demise. The general 
limitation, comparing the duration of income bonds with that of 
ordinary bonds, would preclude abnormally distant maturities, 
but not interfere with general corporate practice.105 Such require-
ments alone should be conclusive of indebtedness, since other pro-
visions in the indenture are only incidental to 'be debtor-creditor 
103 See I DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS, 5th ed., 176 (1953): " .•. The 
first of these is the direct statement that the bond is a promise to pay a certain sum 
of money. This statement, more than any other, distinguishes the bond from the share 
of stock and indicates clearly that the bondholder is a creditor and not a partner in 
the corporate enterprise. It is a categorical statement. It represents the contractual obliga-
tion on the part of the corporation; and all other clauses, stipulations, and provisions 
of the bond itself and of the supplementary agreement are merely addenda to this 
primary and original obligation." See also 2 JoNES, BONDS AND BOND SECURITIES, 4th ed., 
§601 (1935), and cases cited. 
104 See Jordan Co. v. Allen, (M.D. Ga. 1949) 85 F. Supp. 437 at 445. 
105 In John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 at 526 (1946), the Supreme 
Court states that there must be "a definite maturity date in the reasonable future." See 
Swoby Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 887 at 894 (1947), where the Tax Court considered 
a 99-year obligation to be unreasonable. The proposed test for a valid maturity provision 
would be more definite than the "reasonableness" test as now applied by the courts, 
while allowing variations in conformity with accepted business practice. 
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relationship and do not change its nature. For example, a creditor 
may choose to relinquish his usual rights on liquidation or accept 
a non-cumulative contingent return in exchange for a higher rate 
of interest than would be paid had these concessions not been 
made. Regardless of the agreement between the parties as to 
the terms of compensation and rights on liquidation, their basic 
relationship of debtor-creditor remains unchanged. Also, the fact 
that bonds are exchanged for preferred stock upon consultation 
with the Internal Revenue Code should be of no consequence. The 
question is, has an indebtedness been created, not why was it 
created, and the contention that the only way an indebtedness 
can arise is by the receipt of new funds is certainly without merit. 
Where a closely-held corporation is involved, and the bonds 
are issued to its stockholders, the requirements should be somewhat 
more stringent because of the possibility of an underlying agree-
ment that the principal will not be demanded although such 
right may appear on the face of the indenture. Consequently, it 
may be necessary to require such an additional safeguard as 
periodic payments into a sinking fund held by a disinterested 
third party for the retirement of the income bonds at maturity. 
Serial retirements would be an acceptable alternative, an equal 
number of bonds being retired over the duration of the issue. 
III. Conclusion 
The striking aspect of this study of income bonds is the dichot-
omy of result between sections I and II of this comment. On the 
one hand, an economic and historical evaluation reveals that for 
practical purposes income bonds are the equivalents of preferred 
stock. The investor holding income bonds rather than preferred 
stock has almost an identical investment with perhaps certain 
additional safeguards and advantages over the normal preferred 
stockholder. On the other hand, the tax treatment afforded these 
two transactions recognizes a substantial difference between pre-
ferred stock and the carefully drawn income bond. If taxpayers and 
tax lawyers in substantial numbers take advantage of this 
dichotomy in the future, Congress will no doubt act to destroy 
this difference. Until such time, this difference would seem to 
merit careful attention. 
Guy B. Maxfield, S.Ed. 
Michael M. Lyons, S.Ed. 
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APPENDIX 
1. Armour and Co. (Ill.), 5% Cum. Inc. Sub. Debs., due 1984. 
2. Baltimore and Ohio R. Co., Conv. 4½% Inc. Bonds, due 2010. 
3. Boston and Maine R. Co., 4½% Inc. Mtge. Bonds, Series A, due 1970. 
4. Chicago and Great Western Ry. Co., 4½% Gen. Inc. Mtge. Bonds, due 2038. 
5. Chicago and Eastern Illinois R. Co., 5% Inc. Debs., due 2054. 
6. Chicago, Indianapolis, and Louisville Ry. Co.: 
(a) First Mtge. 4% Inc. Bonds, Series A, due 1983. 
(b) Second Mtge. 4½% Inc. Bonds, Series A, due 2003. 
7. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, and Pacific R. Co.: 
(a) Gen. Mtge. 4½% Inc. Bonds, Series A, due 2019. 
(b) Gen. Mtge. 4½% Conv. Inc. Bonds, Series B, due 2044. 
(c) 5% Inc. Debs., Series A, due 2055. 
8. Chicago and Northwestern Ry. Co., Second Mtge. 4½% Conv. Inc. Bonds, Series A, 
due 1999. 
9. Chicago, Rock Island, and Pacific R. Co., 40-year 4½% Inc. Debs., due 1995. 
10. Curtis Publishing Co., 30-year 6% Sub. Inc. Debs., Series of 1956, due 1986. 
11. Erie R. Co., Gen. Mtge. 4½% Inc. Bonds, Series A, due 2015. 
12. Minneapolis-Moline Co., 6% Sub. S.F. Inc. Debs., due 1986. 
13. Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Sault Ste. Marie R. Co.: 
(a) First Mtge. 4½% Cum. Inc. Bonds, Series A, due 1971. 
(b) Gen. Mtge. 4% Inc. Bonds, Series A, due 1991. 
14. Missouri Pacific R. Co.: 
(a) Gen. Mtge. 4¾% Inc. Bonds, Series A, due 2020. 
(b) Gen. Mtge. 4¾% Inc. Bonds, Series B, due 2030. 
(c) 5% Inc. Debs., due 2045. 
15. New York, Chicago, and St. Louis R. Co., 35-year 4½% Inc. Debs., due 1989. 
16. New York, New Haven, and Hartford R. Co., Gen. Mtge. Inc. Bonds, 4½%, Series A, 
due 2022. 
17. New York, Susquehanna, and Western R. Co., Series A, Gen. Mtge. 4½% Inc. Bonds, 
due 2019. 
18. Peoria and Eastern Ry. Co., Inc. Mtge. 4% Noncum. Bonds, due 1990. 
19. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co: 
(a) 50-year Inc. 5% Debs., Series A, due 2006. 
(b) Second Mtge. Inc. 4½% Bonds, Series A, due 2022. 
20. Spokane International R. Co., Inc. Mtge. 4½% Bonds, Series A, due 2013. 
21. Wabash R. Co.: 
(a) Gen. 4% Inc. Bonds, Series A, due 1981. 
(b) Gen. 4¼% Inc. Bonds, Series B, due 1991. 
22. Western Pacific R. Co., 30-year 5% Inc. Debs., due 1984. 
23. Wisconsin Central R. Co., Gen. Mtge. 4½% Inc. Bonds, Series A, due 2029. 
